Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care market with private and public provision by Alves, Vasco
 
 
Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care
market with private and public provision
Alves, Vasco
DOI:
10.1080/15140326.2019.1594010
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Alves, V 2019, 'Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care market with private and public provision'
Journal of Applied Economics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 173-194. https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2019.1594010
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 08/04/2019
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 02. May. 2019
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=recs20
Journal of Applied Economics
ISSN: 1514-0326 (Print) 1667-6726 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/recs20
Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care
market with private and public provision
Vasco F. Alves
To cite this article: Vasco F. Alves (2019) Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care
market with private and public provision, Journal of Applied Economics, 22:1, 173-194, DOI:
10.1080/15140326.2019.1594010
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2019.1594010
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 08 Apr 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Pricing and waiting time decisions in a health care market
with private and public provision
Vasco F. Alves
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper describes a duopoly market for healthcare where one of
the two providers is publicly owned and charges a price of zero,
while the other sets a price so as to maximize its proﬁt. Both
providers are subject to congestion in the form of an M/M/1
queue, and they serve patient-consumers who have randomly
distributed unit costs of time. Consumer demand (as market
share) for both providers is obtained and described. The private
provider’s pricing decision is explored, equilibrium existence is
proven, and conditions for uniqueness presented. Comparative
statics for demand are presented. Social welfare functions are
described and the welfare maximizing condition obtained. More
detailed results are then obtained for cases when costs follow
uniform and Kumaraswamy distributions. Numerical simulations
are then performed for these distributions, employing several
parameter values, demonstrating the private provider’s pricing
decision and its relationship with social welfare.
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1. Introduction
Waiting times are a problem aﬀecting most health care systems. This is especially true
where rationing is required, although its root cause is simply that capacity is limited
while treatments take time to perform. Queueing imposes a further cost on the patient-
consumer, and in this way, health care ﬁts into a wide body of literature which deals
with the economic causes, behaviour and consequences of queues.
Rationing is common in public health care systems, such as the British NHS. Where
systems of this type are present, a private sector often remains in operation, being able
to oﬀer shorter waiting times to those willing to pay. The present paper deals with the
pricing decisions of a single proﬁt-maximizing private provider of healthcare, which
operates in a market also served by a public provider oﬀering free treatment. The
approach to modelling the health care market follows a simpliﬁed version of that
outlined in (Goddard, Malek, & Tavakoli, 1995). However, unlike that model, where
the focus was on the NHS sector and its outcomes, the present paper focuses on the
pricing decisions of the private sector: in particular, in Goddard et al. (1995), the private
sector set a market-clearing price by design and was not subject to congestion, whereas
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here the sole private provider exercises market power and is subject to congestion in
a manner similar to the public sector – although in equilibrium, congestion will be
lower in the former. The present model yields similar results to Goddard et al. (1995)
regarding the responses of demand for public and private sector treatment when
capacity increases, namely, that an increase in capacity reduces expected waiting time
in the public sector, and therefore increases demand for that sector while reducing it for
the private. However, in the present model price is a decision variable, so that its
response to an increase in capacity cannot be compared with the market-clearing
response in that model.
The private provider’s decision problem is solved with recourse to the basic model of
competition in waiting times presented in (Levhari & Luski, 1978; Luski, 1976), taking
a special case where one provider charges price zero (i.e., the NHS). This work’s chief
contribution is the analysis of private sector decisions when it is subject to congestion
and possesses market power. It is appropriate to use queueing theory to model the
waiting time features of the health care market, as argued persuasively by (Goddard
et al., 1995). Queueing has been a subject of economic analysis since the seminal work
of (Naor, 1969), which dealt with optimal queue sizes in M=M=1 FCFS queues, and
sketched a framework for individual decisions taken by impatient consumers which
have been almost universally followed. These results were extended to an arbitrary
number of queues by Knudsen (1972).
1.1. Related literature
Both (Levhari & Luski, 1978; Luski, 1976) employed the queueing framework to model
duopolistic competition between two identical providers selling a good whose provision
requires queueing. The two providers simultaneously choose the price, and this decision
aﬀects demand both directly and indirectly through waiting time. Consumers are
diﬀerentiated through a randomly distributed unit cost of waiting time. The key result
of Levhari & Luski (1978) is to show there is a separating equilibrium where one
provider specializes in serving consumers with high waiting costs at a high price, and
the other provider serves consumers with low waiting costs at low prices. This frame-
work is adapted for the present paper, with the public sector charging a price of zero,
and the outside option is constructed such that no consumer will choose it in
equilibrium.
A model similar to that in Levhari & Luski (1978) was devised by Chen & Frank
(2004) for a monopolist provider, and then extended to a duopoly in Chen & Wan
(2003). Their model assumes the presence of an outside option and allows for hetero-
geneous ﬁrms. Lederer & Li (1997) has some relevance for the present problem, as it
deals with consumer heterogeneity in delay cost, which is important in the health care
context. (Li & Lee, 1994), describe a model of competition in three product character-
istics: price, quality and service speed, where the good’s value declines with time. This
value-decay assumption is often used in the health economics literature.
More recently, Melo (2014) established the existence and uniqueness of a pure
strategy price equilibrium in a congested market with free entry and price competition.
His results predict congested markets will have a greater number of ﬁrms than is
socially optimal. Dube & Jain (2014) revisited the Bertrand equilibrium between
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providers competing on cost and waiting time in a congestible system, found the
conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, then considered a setting where
diﬀerentiated services with quality of service guarantees were introduced. However, this
was found not to result in any global welfare improvement. Deck, Kimbrough, &
Mongrain (2014) set up a model of duopoly competition on time and price, where
one provider sets up an express and a regular checkout, charging with the former,
competing with another with only one checkout. This was found to be harmful to
sellers and beneﬁcial to consumers, with the single queue seller servicing patient
shoppers, driving down prices and proﬁts, but increasing consumer surplus.
Models in this family have been applied to markets other than health care as well.
Zhou, Albuquerque, & Grewal (2016) presents a model of competition in the airline
industry where the delay is one of several factors ﬁrms compete on, and analyse how
strategic interactions aﬀect the optimal delay and reliability measures. (Mazalov &
Melnik, 2016) also consider a market for transport, where providers compete in price
and service time, and solve the pricing problem for providers, deﬁning the equilibrium
intensity ﬂows.
Moving away from industrial organization to the ﬁelds of health economics and the
economics of publicly provided private goods, Barzel (1974) presents a theory of
rationing “free” goods through waiting which is relevant to public health care provision
but does not have queueing as an important feature. (Iversen, 1993) has a model of
resource allocation to meet waiting times within a national health service setting. (Hoel
& Sæther, 2003) and (Marchand & Schroyen, 2005) also consider competition between
private and public health providers – making important contributions to the welfare
economics of the issue. This draws on previous work by Lindsay & Feigenbaum (1984)
(and see (Cullis & Jones, 1986)), where rationing by waiting lists is used, with value
decay rather than the cost of time used to represent consumer impatience. Private
providers have no capacity constraints, and therefore no queueing in equilibrium. This
value decay approach is followed by (Iversen, 1997), who however is chieﬂy concerned
with whether rationing occurs in the public sector, and does not use queuing models.
(Propper, 2000) continued in the same vein as (Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984) by
considering no capacity constraints in the private sector, and using this to analyse
empirically the demand for private care in the UK. d(Dimakou, Dimakou, & Basso,
2015) also develop an empirical model to ﬁnd how hospitals characteristics determine
waiting, ﬁnding the waiting time distribution for UK hospitals in the 1997–2005 period,
and how changes to that distribution are aﬀected by resource allocation, and priorities
given to diﬀerent kinds of patients.
More closely related to the present work, Gravelle & Schroyen, (2016) model
a setting of a public health system with diﬀerent possible rules for hospital payment,
where providers can choose quality. They develop a stochastic model of rationing by
waiting and use it to derive welfare maximising payment to hospitals, which are linked
to output, expected waiting times, quality, and a few other features. Crucially, they show
that quality and waiting times must not be the only factors aﬀecting the price for
optimal outcomes to occur. Andritsos & Aﬂaki (2015) use a game-theoretic queueing
model to examine the eﬀect of a hospital’s objective (i.e., non-proﬁt vs. for-proﬁt) in
hospital markets for elective care. They ﬁnd the presence of competition can preclude
a hospital from achieving economies of scale, and therefore increase waiting times.
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Moreover, they ﬁnd that whether hospitals will engage in homogeneous and hetero-
geneous competition depends on the patients’ willingness to wait before receiving care
and the reimbursement level of the non-proﬁt sector.
Finally, Farnworth (2003) is quite similar to the present paper, including capacity
constraints on the fee-charging provider. The diﬀerence between it and the present
paper is that while there is a fee-charging provider “competing” with a “free” one,
the former has the same “social” objectives as the latter and is therefore not proﬁt-
maximizing, presenting a completely diﬀerent problem. Indeed, the author speciﬁ-
cally describes the model as presenting “two private hospitals that are publicly
funded,” and pricing decisions are made by “policy makers,” for “equity reasons,” –
it is the service rate that is the hospitals’ decision variable. Conversely, the sole
objective of the private sector provider in the present paper is proﬁt maximization,
and it operates without reference to externally set social policy. Nevertheless, he
reaches a similar result in regard to waiting times’ response to a price increase:
a decrease (increase) in the fee-charging (free) sector, providing corroboration of
one of the present model’s results.
2. The model
The model combines (Goddard et al., 1995)’s approach to queueing in health care
markets with the framework for duopoly competition in price and waiting time in
(Levhari & Luski, 1978). Adaptations to the latter include: (i) restricting the public
provider to charge a price of zero; and (ii) instead of there being a disutility of
waiting in the queue, and positive utility coming from a good bought after being
served, disutility accrues regardless of whether one chooses to queue or not
(reﬂecting the suﬀering caused by disease) and the “good” to be purchased is
a treatment which eliminates the suﬀering. This is similar to what has been
developed in Farnworth, 2003; Iversen(1997); Lindsay & Feigenbaum (1984), and
others. However, the framework represents an ongoing disutility rather than an
exponential decay of treatment value, as generally assumed. While it can be shown
that the two approaches are formally equivalent (for which, see Appendix A), the
one adopted here is more in keeping with the approach adopted in the queueing
literature.
2.1. Consumers
Consumers are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, whose utility function is linear
in waiting time, and whose expected lifespan from the time of disease occurrence is τ.1
The intuition behind the speciﬁcation adopted here is that in healthcare, the value of
a treatment is not so much a pure beneﬁt, but the removal of a pre-existing condition
causing disutility. The assumption that the disease does not cause a shortening of
expected lifespan, but only disutility during that lifespan, obviously exchanges some
generality for simplicity of treatment, but that accurately reﬂects many conditions,
1As consumers are risk neutral, the expectations term is omitted throughout.
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including some that cause the most problems with waiting times (hip fractures requir-
ing a hip replacement are a notorious example).
Consumers suﬀer a disutility of c per unit of time, which can be interpreted as the
severity of the consumer’s illness. As illness severity varies across consumers, c is
a random variable following a continuous and bounded probability distribution
function:
f ðcÞ; x 2 ½0;c; (1)
where c is ﬁnite and FðcÞ is the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
Disease cost c is suﬀered until removed by treatment at Ti, the waiting time for
provider i ¼ n; pf g, where n denotes the public and p the private providers. If the
consumer does not seek treatment, they will suﬀer c until death, i.e., for τ units of time.
The expected utility of seeking treatment from provider i is then:
Ui ¼ cTi  Pi; (2)
where Pn ¼ 0, and Pp ¼ P is the price charged by the private provider. The expected
utility of foregoing treatment, Uo, is:
Uo ¼ cτ:
Total potential demand for health care is given by the exogenous parameter λ. This
can be thought of as representing a patient population which is ﬁxed in the short-run.
The two providers will each service a share of this total, which will be the arrival rate for
that provider’s queue.2 Following the literature (e.g., Levhari & Luski, (1978)), this
parameter is normalized such that λ ¼ 1, without any loss of generality, because the
unit of time t is arbitrary so that it is always possible to ﬁnd one measure of time for
which the arrival rate is 1.
Unlike Goddard et al. (1995), there is no consideration of consumer income – all
consumers can aﬀord the private sector treatment. While this is a restrictive assump-
tion, made in the interest of simplicity, the problem is treated in this way to allow for
a clear focus on the private provider’s pricing decisions in response to the public sector
provision. Interaction with consumer income constraints and heterogeneity, while
doubtlessly important, is left for further research.
2.2. Providers
It is assumed that neither the private nor the public sectors have costs, or in what is
perhaps a preferable interpretation, those costs are sunk in the short-run. It is further
assumed that for both the private and public sectors, service times are identically and
independently distributed along an exponential distribution with rate μ. The assump-
tion is made that μ > 1, meaning that either server is capable of, by itself, serving the
entire demand stream λ ¼ 1. The assumption is required in order to avoid the explosive
growth of waiting times. This rate is exogenous and common to both servers. This
parameter can be taken to reﬂect the state of technology. For example, improvements in
2It is not required that the two shares add up to 1, as patients can opt for not seeking treatment. Nevertheless, given
the way the model is constructed, the shares of the two providers will always add up to 1 in equilibrium. An
explanation follows below.
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surgical techniques allowing for hospital stays to be reduced would lead to an increase
in the service rate. In what is a simplifying departure from Goddard et al. (1995), it is
assumed that only one consumer can be treated at a time. This turns the queueing
process into the well-knownM=M=1 system.
Expected waiting time for each provider, as a function of arrival and service rates,
can be obtained from a well-known result in queueing theory (see, inter alia, (Gross,
Shortle, Thompson, & Harris, 2008)):
Ti ¼ 1
μ λi ;i 2 n; pf g: (3)
As the present paper is concerned with the analysis of competition between public and
private providers in health care, the assumption will be made that both the public and
private providers exist and are used by at least one consumer. For this to happen, it
must be the case that Un ¼ cTn >Uo ¼ cτ, which implies that τ >Tn. Since, by
assumption, the public sector does not charge for treatment, regardless of demand,
and τ >Tn, no consumers will forego treatment, and the public sector will serve its
entire demand stream at zero monetary cost.
Meanwhile, private sector demand, given the exogenous parameter μ, is
a function of P, which is set at the value that maximizes the provider’s instanta-
neous proﬁt function:
max
P
π ¼ max
P
λpP: (4)
3. Demand
3.1. Individual choice
An individual consumer chooses to seek care from a particular provider if two condi-
tions are satisﬁed: his expected utility is larger than that of joining the waiting list for
the other provider, and it is larger than that of foregoing treatment.
For a consumer with a given value of c, expected utility when seeking care from the
private or public provider can be obtained from Equation (2):
Up ¼ cTp  P; (5)
and
Un ¼ cTn: (6)
A consumer will then seek care from the private sector when:
c >
P
Tn  Tp : (7)
On the other hand, the consumer will choose the public provider when (assuming
indiﬀerent consumers will opt for the public sector)3
3Returning to the assumption that both a public and a private sector exist, and are used by at least one consumer, it
must be the case that Tp < Tn, and therefore Tp < τ. Proof by contradiction: for Up >Un , it is necessary that c > PTnTp .
But if Tp > Tn , this requires that c< 0, which is not a possible value of c. Cf. a similar discussion in (Luski, 1976).:
178 V. F. ALVES
c  P
Tn  Tp : (8)
Let c be the critical value of c for which a consumer is indiﬀerent between the two
providers:
cðP;Tn;TpÞ ¼ PTn  Tp : (9)
3.2. Market demand
Market demand for the private and public providers is obtained from the individual
optimization process described in subsection 3.1. Potential demand λ divides itself
between the two providers, with the share of consumers with c  c choosing the
public provider, and the share with c > c the private provider, so that as c decreases,
the private provider’s market share increases. The two demand functions are then:
λp ¼
ðc
c
f ðcÞdc ) λpðcÞ ¼ 1 FðcÞ; and (10)
λn ¼
ðc
0
f ðcÞdc ) λnðcÞ ¼ FðcÞ: (11)
It can be seen from Equation (9) that c is itself a function of Tn, Tp, and P. The former
two values (as set out in Equation (3)) are themselves a function of demand and the
parameter μ. Ultimately, demand is then determined by the shape of f ðcÞ, and the
values of μ and P, the latter being the private provider’s decision variable, as set out in
subsection 4.3 below.
4. Supply
4.1. Providers
Waiting times Tn and Tp depend on P, but only indirectly through λn and λp, both of
which are a function of c. So it is possible, through implicit diﬀerentiation, to show
that c is increasing in P even when taking into account the indirect eﬀects, where c, λp
and λn are as presented in (9)-(11). The direct eﬀect corresponds to the direct increase
of c in response to P, while the indirect eﬀects are those mediated by the increase in Tn
and decrease in Tp caused by the shift in the respective demands in response to an
increase in price. Let c0P;
@cðP;TnðλnðcÞ;μÞ;TpðλpðcÞ;μÞÞ
@P , the total derivative of c
 with regard
to P. This is given by the following expression4
c0P ¼ ðTn  TpÞ þ cf ðcÞðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
> 0: (12)
4See Appendix B for the more detailed derivation of this and the following expressions.:
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This result leads to the following two lemmas, which establish that private sector
demand is bounded between 0 and half of the market5
Lemma 1. For any continuous distribution function f ðcÞ; x 2 ½0; c meeting the condi-
tions in (1), there is a price P which at the limit makes demand for the private provider
equal to zero.
Lemma 2. For any distribution function f ðcÞ; x 2 ½0; c meeting the conditions in (1),
when P ! 0, demand for the private sector equals that for the public sec-
tor: λnðcÞ ¼ λpðcÞ ¼ 12 .
As @λp=@P< 0, this further implies that demand for private sector treatment will
never exceed that for the public sector.
4.2. Comparative statics
The same process can be used to ascertain the eﬀects a shock to μ will have on c, if P
does not change. Let c0μ;
@cðP;TnðλnðcÞ;μÞ;TpðλpðcÞ;μÞÞ
@μ , the total derivative of c
 with regard
to μ. Then:
c*μ ¼
PðT2n  T2pÞ
ðTn  TpÞ2 þ Pf ðc*ÞðT2n þ T2pÞ
> 0: (13)
As demand for either provider, as set out in (10)-(11), is a direct function of c alone, it
is easy to sign their comparative statics in respect of both P and μ, considering P as
a parameter, which yield fairly intuitive results (see Appendix B for the detailed results):
as expected, a price increase will cause demand for the private sector to fall and that for
the public sector to increase. This eﬀect reduces the expected waiting time for the
private sector, for which the consumers with higher time costs are willing to pay the
increased price. Section 4.3 describes the private sector’s pricing decision.
On the other hand, when the service rate increases, the expected waiting time falls
for both sectors. This reduces the private sector’s comparative advantage over the public
sector so that for a constant value of P, its demand would fall – similarly, to retain the
same market share, it would have to reduce P.
4.3. Private provider optimization
The proﬁt maximization process follows the model presented in (Levhari & Luski, 1978;
Luski, 1976), but with the public provider constrained to charge a price of zero, so that
the private provider will not interact strategically with the public sector. Rather, it will
set P at the level P which maximizes its instantaneous proﬁt function:
P ¼ argmax
P
π ¼ argmax
P
λpP: (14)
5See Appendix B for the proofs of these, and all following Lemmas and Theorems.:
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Note that waiting time in both sectors is then determined by the private provider, as it
is a function of P and parameter μ (via c). Let π0P;
@πðλpðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞÞ;PÞ
@P , the total
derivative of π with regard to P. Then, the maximization problem will have the
following ﬁrst-order condition:
π0P ¼ λpðcðP;Tnðλn; μÞ;Tpðλp; μÞÞ þ Pλp0P ¼ 0; (15)
where λp0P is known to be negative. P
 then follows from solving the ﬁrst order
condition for P:
P ¼ 1 Fðc
Þ
f ðcÞc0P ¼
λp
f ðcÞc0P : (16)
The existence of P can be easily derived from the intermediate value theorem:
Theorem 1. There exists at least one value of P which maximizes the private provider’s
proﬁts.
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt in equilibrium, π is then given by:
π ¼ PλpðcðP;Tnðλn; μÞ;Tpðλp; μÞÞ ¼
λ2p
f ðcÞc0P ¼
ð1 FðcÞÞ2
f ðcÞc0P : (17)
While existence could be shown from the ﬁrst order condition alone, consideration of
the uniqueness of P requires engaging with the second order condition as well:
Lemma 3. It is a suﬃcient condition for P to be a unique local maximum in the range
ð0; PÞ for:
@f ðcÞ
@c
c0Pð Þ2 þ f ðcÞ @
2c
@P2
> 0:
Lemma 3 presents only a suﬃcient condition, so one cannot guarantee uniqueness
for distributions which do not meet the conditions presented. However, numerical
simulations have failed to produce a counter-example where P is not an unique
maximum on the relevant range, even when the suﬃcient conditions set out in the
lemma were not met.
5. Welfare
In the present context, welfare for the consumers seeking treatment from provider i can
be deﬁned as the gain in disease-free time from seeking treatment (τ  Ti), across all
consumers seeking treatment from that provider, i.e., multiplied by the expected value
of c for each demand stream. To this is subtracted the price of seeking treatment in the
case of those consumers choosing the private sector. Therefore, welfare accruing to
consumers in unit time, Wi, i 2 n; pf g, is given by the following expressions:
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Wnðc;TnÞ ¼
ðc
0
c f ðcÞdc
 !
ðτ  TnÞ ) (18)
Wpðc;Tp; PÞ ¼
ðc
c
c f ðcÞdc
 
ðτ  TpÞ  λpP: (19)
Let W be aggregate social welfare, obtained from the sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and the
welfare of the two demand streams. The second term inWp cancels out the ﬁrm’s proﬁt,
so that W is given by:
W ¼ Wn þWp þ π ¼
ðc
0
c f ðcÞdc
 !
ðτ  TnÞ þ
ðc
c
c f ðcÞdc
 
ðτ  TpÞ )
Wðc;Tn;TpÞ ¼
ðc
0
c f ðcÞdc
 
τ 
ðc
0
c f ðcÞdc
 !
Tn 
ðc
c
c f ðcÞdc
 
Tp:
(20)
The ﬁrst term 
c
0c f ðcÞdc
 
τ ¼ E½cτ is the expected disutility of seeking no treatment,
for all consumers. It is a constant term determined exogenously, the product of the
expected value of c across the consumer population and expected lifespan τ. The two
subsequent terms are the product of the expected value of the share of consumers
seeking demand from each provider, and the expected waiting time for that provider, so
that as waiting time falls, disease-free time increases, as does welfare. Equations (18)-
(20) can be re-written using integration by parts, for which, see Appendix B. These
alternate expressions are more mathematically tractable, while those presented in the
main body are more intuitively understandable.
Let W 0P;
@WðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞ;Tnðλp;μÞ;Tnðλp;μÞÞ
@P , the total derivative of W with regard to
P. Further, let PW be the social welfare maximizing price, such that W 0PjP¼PW ¼ 0;
substituting this value back into W yields the largest possible social welfare WM.
Then, W 0P is given by:
W 0P ¼ c0Pf ðcÞ cðTp  TnÞ þ T2pEðc  cÞ½1 FðcÞ  T2nEðc  cÞFðcÞ
h i
: (21)
The last line of Equation (21) expresses the trade-oﬀs at play particularly clearly. By
increasing its price, the private provider increases the welfare accruing to those con-
sumers who still choose to buy care from the private sector after the price increase, as
the fall in demand causes a fall in expected waiting time (these consumers are repre-
sented by the positive term T2p Eðc  cÞ½1 FðcÞð Þ). On the other hand, welfare is lost
from the increase in expected waiting time in the share of consumers seeking care from
the public provider (represented by the negative term  T2n Eðc  cÞFðcÞð Þ). (Recall
from Equation (9) that the term cðTp  TnÞ is the price.) These changes are mediated
via the derivative of the critical value, c0P, and the distribution function f ðcÞ.
Equation (21) can be used to show it is welfare increasing for the private provider to
charge a strictly positive price:
Theorem 2. The welfare maximizing private sector price is strictly positive (i.e., PW > 0)
for all well behaved distributions where f ðcÞ> 0"c 2 ð0;cÞ.
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Note, however, that there are positive prices which yield worse outcomes, and this
result does not guarantee that the proﬁt-maximizing price will improve welfare when
compared to a price of 0 on both sectors.
Like several other expressions presented in the foregoing, (21) above is not easily
tractable through analytical means as long as f ðcÞ is not speciﬁed. Therefore, section 6
below presents more detailed results for a selection of tractable distributions.
6. Numerical simulations
This section will present numerical results for a set of probability distributions for the
disutility of waiting, f ðcÞ. The Kumaraswamy distribution will be used for this purpose.
This is a bounded continuous distribution, where virtually every continuous shape can
be obtained in the interval ½0; 16 by varying its parameters a; b> 0 (for instance, the
Uniform distribution is a special case where a ¼ b ¼ 1). It is much more tractable than
the more widely known Beta distribution. The general probability density function and
cumulative distribution function are deﬁned as follows:
f ðc; a; bÞ ¼ abca1ð1 caÞb1; (22)
Fðc; a; bÞ ¼ 1 ð1 caÞb: (23)
Numerical results will be presented for three diﬀerent speciﬁcations: the uniform
distribution, a left-skewed distribution, and a right-skewed distribution.
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne the following three probability distribution functions:
f1ðcÞ ¼ 1
f2ðcÞ ¼ 2c
f3ðcÞ ¼ 2ð1 cÞ;
where f1ðcÞ is the uniform distribution, f2ðcÞ is a Kumaraswamy distribution with
parameters a ¼ 2 and b ¼ 1 (left-skewed), and f3ðcÞ is a Kumaraswamy distribution
with parameters a ¼ 1 and b ¼ 2 (right-skewed) (see Figure 1).
To these p.d.f.s correspond the following cumulative distribution functions (see Figure 2):
F1ðcÞ ¼ c
F2ðcÞ ¼ c2
F3ðcÞ ¼ 2c c2:
See Appendix C for the development of the model for the distributions used.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show, for each of the three foregoing distributions, the results
obtained for waiting times, market share, price, proﬁt and social welfare. For the latter
results, let Wn, Wp, and W denote social welfare when the private provider is charging
the proﬁt-maximizing price P, for the share of consumers choosing the public provi-
der, the share choosing the private provider, and the total, respectively; WM denotes
social welfare when the private provider is charging the social welfare maximizing price
6Without loss of generality, as the measure of consumer disutility is arbitrary.
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PW , and W2n denotes the social welfare when there are two public providers charging
a price of 0 and sharing demand equally. Each table corresponds to one of the
distributions. There follows a section discussing the results presented here.
6.1. Discussion
Analysis of the simulation results yields some notable ﬁndings. It is noteworthy that, for
all distributions, as μ increases, W approaches WM even as P and π fall, though the
latter two values remain strictly positive. This can be intuitively explained as the
increase in μ improving the service of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector,
therefore forcing the latter to reduce its price. This is in line with the result in Equation
(B6) showing λp is decreasing in μ for a constant price – clearly, even when the private
sector changes its price to respond to the fall in demand, the downward pressure on
demand still dominates.
There is a unique value of P – in fact, numerical simulations beyond those displayed
here were not able to produce any counter-example where multiple equilibria emerged.
Figure 1. Probability Distribution Functions f1ðcÞ-f3ðcÞ
Figure 2. Cumulative Distribution Functions F1ðcÞ-F3ðcÞ
Table 1. Numerical simulations for distribution function f1ðcÞ, τ ¼ 8.
μ Tn Tp λn λp P π Wn Wp W PW WM W2n
1:2 2.719 0.969 0.832 0.168 1.457 0.244 1.829 0.836 2.909 0.163 3.304 3.286
1:5 1.443 0.765 0.807 0.193 0.547 0.106 2.134 1.157 3.397 0.090 3.510 3.500
2 0.831 0.557 0.796 0.204 0.218 0.045 2.272 1.318 3.635 0.045 3.672 3.667
4 0.312 0.264 0.790 0.210 0.038 0.008 2.399 1.446 3.853 0.010 3.858 3.857
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Comparing the results for the three distributions, one observes similar move-
ments in welfare, prices and market shares when μ increases. It is interesting to note
that the private sector’s proﬁt-maximizing price is higher for the uniform distribu-
tion than for either of the skewed distributions. This indicates the private sector’s
market power is higher under these circumstances. This is interesting and unex-
pected. While a full explanation of this phenomenon if left for further research, one
intuitively plausible explanation is that there are countervailing forces weighing on
the private sector’s market power. On the one hand, if there are relatively few
consumers with high values of c, then the ﬁrm must lower the price to increase
revenue directly. On the other hand, there are relatively more consumers with high
values of c, the direct eﬀect on revenue of lowering the price by a small amount will
be larger. On the other hand, this will have a countervailing eﬀect, as more
consumers seek to use the private provider, increasing waiting times and reducing
demand. The uniform distribution would seem to be closer to the best distribution
for a higher proﬁt than either of the skewed distributions.
Turning to social welfare, this is highest on the left-skewed distribution f2ðcÞ, and
lowest on the right-skewed distribution f3ðcÞ, presumably because a greater mass of
consumers with a lower time cost has less to gain from the private sector’s presence.
This intuition is conﬁrmed when it is noted f3ðcÞ presents the lowest market share and
proﬁts for the private sector.
When the social welfare is compared with the situation where there are two
public providers charging a price of 0, regardless of the distribution, it is the case
that the private sector equilibrium price produces an inferior outcome to the case
where there are two public providers instead. However, this is always inferior to the
socially optimal outcome where the private provider charges price PW . Figure 3
illustrates this by showing how, for f1ðcÞ, social welfare varies with the price for
diﬀerent values of μ, where the dark dot on each line represents welfare at the
proﬁt-maximizing price P.
This suggests an argument for price regulation of the private sector. Presumably, this
is due to the private sector functioning as an escape valve for consumers with very high
disease costs who are willing to pay a lot to be served more quickly.
Table 2. Numerical simulations for distribution function f2ðcÞ, τ ¼ 8.
μ Tn Tp λn λp P π Wn Wp W PW WM W2n
1:2 2.596 0.985 0.815 0.185 1.454 0.269 2.650 0.967 3.886 0.122 4.389 4.381
1:5 1.406 0.776 0.789 0.211 0.559 0.118 3.078 1.325 4.522 0.068 4.671 4.667
2 0.818 0.563 0.778 0.222 0.225 0.050 3.284 1.507 4.841 0.034 4.891 4.889
4 0.310 0.265 0.771 0.229 0.039 0.009 3.474 1.653 5.136 0.007 5.143 5.143
Table 3. Numerical simulations for distribution function f3ðcÞ, τ ¼ 8.
μ Tn Tp λn λp P π Wn Wp W PW WM W2n
1:2 2.897 0.948 0.855 0.145 1.206 0.175 1.148 0.589 1.912 0.127 2.208 2.190
1:5 1.490 0.753 0.829 0.171 0.432 0.074 1.363 0.825 2.262 0.071 2.343 2.333
2 0.846 0.550 0.818 0.182 0.170 0.031 1.452 0.941 2.423 0.035 2.449 2.444
4 0.314 0.262 0.811 0.189 0.029 0.006 1.532 1.032 2.569 0.008 2.572 2.571
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7. Conclusion
Waiting times aﬀect competition in healthcare in a way that is not adequately captured
by traditional models. The present paper, using methods derived from the applications
of queueing theory to Industrial Organization and Health Economics, contributes to the
understanding of this phenomenon, following the lead of (Farnworth, 2003; Lindsay &
Feigenbaum, 1984), among others.
When a proﬁt-maximizing private provider acts as a competitor to a public provider
of health care, and that private provider faces capacity constraints resulting in queues,
in a similar manner to the public sector, but can vary its demand by varying the price,
there will always exist at least one price which maximizes the private sector’s proﬁt.
This equilibrium’s uniqueness will depend on the distribution of consumers’ cost of
waiting time/illness severity.
Comparative statics can be obtained for demand functions for any given distribution
of c. Some of the most noteworthy results include that an increase (decrease) in the
price charged by the private sector causes an increase (decrease) in demand for the
public sector, as well as their waiting time; that a positive price for the private sector is
welfare enhancing when compared with free treatment in two providers, and that an
increase in the service rate μ decreases waiting times for both sectors, reducing the
attractiveness of the private sector and lowering its demand. This forces the private
sector to reduce its price, approximating the welfare maximizing value with higher
values of μ. The most promising lead for further research is relaxing the assumption
that both providers have the same service rates, and allowing at least the private sector
to choose its own rate.
Further, the numerical results strongly suggest that the private sector equilibrium
price is too high from a social welfare point of view. Further research should explore the
eﬀects of the public sector charging a regulated small price compared to a private sector
charging a proﬁt-maximizing price.
Other warranted topics for further research include, in the ﬁrst instance, to incor-
porate consumer income constraints and distribution into the decision process. Other
interesting extensions are to incorporate long-run capacity decisions by providers, and
allowing for a plurality of private (and possibly public) providers. Numerical simula-
tions of model outcomes for diﬀerent distributions are also warranted, as is a further
examination of how intertemporal considerations and discounting might aﬀect con-
sumer decisions.
Figure 3. W as a function of P
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Appendix A. Equivalence of Exponential and Linear Formulation
Many works addressing waiting times in health care have formulated consumer utility using
exponential decay. The following is an example, taken from (Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984):
Ui ¼ Vðu; pÞegt: (A1)
In (A1), Vðu; pÞ is the value of the good; in this case, the treatment, which is a function of
a vector of parameters u, and of price p. This value decays at rate g per unit of time t. Applying
this function to the present problem, if u is held constant and V is a linear function of p such that
V ¼ v p, where v is the value of the good before its price is deducted, (A1) becomes:
Ui ¼ ðv pÞegt: (A2)
This can then be transformed by taking logs:
~Ui ¼ ln Ui ¼ ln ðv pÞ  gt: (A3)
Both v and p are arbitrary, so they can be redeﬁned to new values such that Λ ¼ lnðv pÞ:
~Ui ¼ Λ gt; (A4)
where g is equivalent to parameter c in the utility function at Equation (2).
There is still one outstanding issue. The presence of value parameter Λ introduces some
mathematical complications. Moreover, as discussed above, medical treatments, especially of
chronic diseases, can hardly be said to possess intrinsic value for consumers, unless perhaps they
suﬀer from Münchausen syndrome. Rather, they are valuable in so far as they remove an illness.
Therefore, take price p as being paid to remove disutility g. It is perfectly possible to postulate
a function V of this kind, say V ¼ p, i.e., there is no beneﬁt from the treatment itself other than
it causing g to stop. This yields the following utility function:
Ui ¼ pegt: (A5)
Taking logs of (A5) yields:
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~Ui ¼ ln Ui ¼ ln ðpÞ  gt: (A6)
Then, once P is deﬁned such that P ¼ lnðpÞ, the utility function from (2) emerges.
Appendix B. Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 1. As c is a continuous and strictly increasing function of P (c0P > 0), and
λpðcÞ is a continuous and decreasing function of c, as deﬁned at (9), it follows that:
lim
c!c λp ¼ 0; (B1)
where P is such that cðP;Tn;TpÞ ¼ c ¼ F1ð1Þ. □
Proof of Lemma 2. This is the reverse of Lemma 1. As c is a continuous and strictly
increasing function of P (c0P > 0), and λpðcÞ is a continuous and decreasing function of
c, as deﬁned at (9), it follows that when P ! 0, the two providers are indistinguishable,
as none of them charges for treatment and they oﬀer the same service rate μ. In this
case the market outcome is a Bertrand equilibrium with the two providers splitting the
market equally: limP!0cð0;Tn;TpÞ ¼ F1 12
 
. □
Derivation of Equation (12): Recall c0P is the total derivative of c
 with regard to P:
c0P ¼
1
Tn  Tp þ
@c
@Tn
@Tn
@λn
@λn
@c
@c
@P
þ @c

@Tp
@Tp
@λp
@λp
@c
@c
@P
> 0:
Solving, it yields Equation (12):
c0P ¼ ðTn  TpÞ þ cf ðcÞðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
> 0; (B2)
as
@c
@Tp
¼  @c

@Tn
¼ PðTn  TpÞ2
;
@Ti
@λi
¼ T2i ; i ¼ fn; pg;
@λn
@c
¼  @λp
@c
¼ f ðcÞ; and ðTn  TpÞ > 0:
Derivation of Equation (13): Recall c0μ is the total derivative of c
 with regard to μ. Then:
c0μ ¼
@c
@Tn
@Tn
@μ
þ @Tn
@λn
@λn
@c
@c
@μ
 
þ @c

@Tp
@Tp
@μ
þ @Tp
@λp
@λp
@c
@c
@μ
 
> 0; "P > 0:
Solving, it yields Equation (13):
c0μ ¼
P T2n  T2p
 
ðTn  TpÞ2 þ P f ðcÞ T2n þ T2p
  > 0; (B3)
where it follows from the waiting time expression at (3) that:
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@Ti
@μ
¼  1ðμ λiÞ2
¼ T2i < 0:
Comparative Statics: Let λp0P ;
@λpðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞÞ
@P , λn
0
P ;
@λnðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞÞ
@P , λp
0
μ ;
@λpðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞÞ
@μ , λn
0
μ ;
@λnðcðP;Tnðλn;μÞ;Tpðλp;μÞÞÞ
@μ , the derivatives of λp and λn in regard to P
and μ, respectively.
λp
0
P ¼
@λp
@c
@c
@P
¼ f ðcÞc0P < 0; (B4)
λn
0
P ¼
@λn
@c
@c
@P
¼ f ðcÞc0P > 0; (B5)
λp
0
μ ¼
@λp
@c
@c
@μ
¼ f ðcÞc0μ < 0; (B6)
λn
0
μ ¼
@λn
@c
@c
@μ
¼ f ðcÞc0μ > 0: (B7)
Proof of Theorem 1. At least one value P exists if the ﬁrst order condition (15) has at
least one zero in the domain P 2 ð0; PÞ, where P is the value for which λp ¼ 0, or
c ¼ c. When P ! 0, (15) takes the form:
lim
P!0
ð1 FðcÞÞ þ Pλp0P
 	
> 0;
whereas when P ! P, c ! c, and (15) takes the form:
lim
P!P
ð1 FðcÞÞ þ Pλp0P
 	 ¼ 0 P f ðcÞc0P < 0:
Since the FOC takes a positive value at one end of the domain, a negative value at the other, and is
continuous across the domain, the intermediate value theorem implies there is at least one zero.
Proof of Lemma 3. If the derivative of the ﬁrst order condition is negative across the
speciﬁed range, P will be unique in that range. This follows from the proof of theorem
1: as one end of the domain is negative and the other positive, and the FOC is
continuous, if its derivative is negative it will only have one zero along that domain.
This condition is given by:
 2f ðcÞc0P  P
@f ðcÞ
@c
c0Pð Þ2 þ f ðcÞ @
2c
@P2

 
< 0; (B8)
evaluated at P. As c0P > 0, (37) holds under the condition presented in lemma 3.
Alternate Versions of Welfare Functions: Both c

0 c f ðcÞdc and 
c
ccf ðcÞdc can be rewritten using
integration by parts:
ðc
0
c f ðcÞdc ¼ cFðcÞ 
ðc
0
FðcÞdcðc
c
c f ðcÞdc ¼ c cFðcÞ 
ðc
c
FðcÞdc:
Then, Wi and W can be written as follows:
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Wn ¼ cFðcÞ 
ðc
0
FðcÞdc
 !
ðτ  TnÞ (B9)
Wp ¼ c cFðcÞ 
ðc
c
FðcÞdc
 
ðτ  TpÞ  λpP (B10)
W ¼ c
ðc
0
FðcÞdc
 
τ þ cFðcÞðTp  TnÞ  cTpþðc
0
FðcÞdc
 !
Tn þ
ðc
c
FðcÞdc
 
Tp:
(B11)
The ﬁnal expression is especially useful to determine how welfare responds to changes in price
and service rate, as c and τ are constants, while the integrand is the cumulative distribution
function. Nevertheless, while the foregoing set is more tractable, it is preferable to use Equations
(18)-(20) for intuitive reasoning about welfare, as the interpretation of Equations (B9)-(B11) is
not straightforward.
Derivation of Equation (21)
Recall W0P is the total derivative of W with regard to P, and that P
W is the social welfare
maximizing price. Then, W0P is given by:
W0P¼ c0PFðcÞþcf ðcÞc0P
 ðTpTnÞþcFðcÞ @Tp
@λp
@λp
@c
c0P@Tn
@λn
@λn
@c
c0P
 
c@Tp
@λp
@λp
@c
c0Pþ @
@P
ðc
0
FðcÞdc
 !
Tnþ
ðc
0
FðcÞdc
 !
@Tn
@λn
@λn
@c
c0P
þ @
@P
ðc
c
FðcÞdc
 
Tpþ
ðc
c
FðcÞdc
 
@Tp
@λp
@λp
@c
c0P,
W0P¼ c0Pf ðcÞ cðTpTnÞT2p cFðcÞcþ
ðc
c
FðcÞdc
  
þT2n
ðc
0
FðcÞdc
 !
cFðcÞ
 !" #
:
W0P¼ c0Pf ðcÞ cðTpTnÞþT2p Eðc cÞ½1FðcÞð ÞT2n Eðc cÞFðcÞð Þ
h i
:
(B12)
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall the derivative of social welfare w.r.t. price given at Equation (21):
W 0P ¼ c0Pf ðcÞ cðTp  TnÞ þ T2pEðc  cÞ½1 FðcÞ  T2nEðc  cÞFðcÞ
h i
:
If the private sector provider were to charge a price of 0, both providers would split the
market equally, and their expected waiting times would be identical (Tn ¼ Tp ¼ T), as
per Lemma 2. This implies that W 0PjP¼0 is given by:
W 0PjP¼0 ¼ c0Pf ðcÞT
1
2
Eðc  cÞ  Eðc  cÞ½ : (B13)
As the term in brackets is obviously positive, and as per Equation (13), so is c0P,
W 0PjP¼0 > 0 for all well behaved distributions where f ðcÞ> 0"c 2 ð0;cÞ.
This implies that it is always welfare increasing to raise P above 0, thus completing the proof.
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Appendix C. Results for Selected Distributions
This section presents the development of the model described in the main body for the
distributions used in the numerical simulations.
C.1. Uniform Distribution
Consider ﬁrst a uniform distribution for c 2 ½0; 1, such that:
f ðcÞ ¼ 1 (C1)
FðcÞ ¼ c: (C2)
Under this distribution, demand and waiting time functions take the following forms:
λn ¼ c; λp ¼ 1 c;
Tn ¼ 1
μ c ; Tp ¼
1
μ 1 cð Þ ;
which taken together form a system of four equations in four unknowns, easily solvable
analytically.
The derivative of c with regard to price follows easily from c:
c0P ¼ Tn  Tp þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
;
which allows analytical derivation of the comparative statics outlined in Equations (B4)-(B5):
λp
0
P ¼ c0P ¼  Tn  Tp þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
λn
0
P ¼ c0P ¼ Tn  Tp þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
:
The private provider’s optimization problem is presented and solved below:
max
P
π ¼ max
P
λpP ¼ max
P
1 cð ÞP
π0P ¼ 0 , λp þ Pλp0P ¼ 0
P ¼ ð1 cÞ Tn  Tp þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
 
:
Once P is known, equilibrium proﬁt follows easily:
π ¼ PλpðPÞ ¼ ð1 cÞ2 Tn  Tp þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
 
:
For price P, welfare levels Wn, Wp, and W are:
Wn ¼ 12 ðc
Þ2ðτ  TnÞ
Wp ¼ 12 1 ðc
Þ2 ðτ  TpÞ  π
W ¼ 1
2
τ  TnðcÞ2 þ Tp ðcÞ2  1
  	
:
The derivative of W with regard to P is then as follows:
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W0P ¼ c0P Tp c þ
Tp
2
1 cð Þ2   Tn c þ Tn2 cð Þ2
 
 
:
This can be set equal to 0 and solved for P, yielding PW , the social welfare maximizing price.
When c is uniformly distributed, the uniqueness of P follows straightforwardly:
Lemma 4. When c is uniformly distributed, P is unique.
Proof. Recall the suﬃcient condition for uniqueness given at Lemma 3. This is met when f ðcÞ
is the uniform distribution, as the ﬁrst term @f ðcÞ=@c c0Pð Þ2 ¼ 0 and the second term is
positive, as shown below:
f ðcÞ @
2c
@P2
¼ ðc0PÞ1 2ðT2n þ T2pÞ þ 2cðT3n  T3pÞ
h i
> 0; (C3)
where ðT3n  T3pÞ > 0 since Tn >Tp.
C.2. Kumaraswamy distributions
This subsection performs the same exercise as above, but for a Kumaraswamy distribution, as
deﬁned in Equations (22)-(23).
Under this distribution, demand and waiting time take the following forms:
λn ¼ 1 ð1 ðcÞaÞb; λp ¼ ð1 ðcÞaÞb;
Tn ¼ 1
μ ½1 ð1 ðcÞaÞb
; Tp ¼ 1
μ ð1 ðcÞaÞb
;
which taken together form a system of four equations in four unknowns, easily solvable
analytically.
The derivative of c with regard to price follows:
c0P ¼ Tn  Tp þ a bðcÞað1 ðcÞaÞb1ðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
;
which allows analytical derivation of the comparative statics outlined in Equations (33)-(34):
λp
0
P ¼ a bðcÞa1ð1 ðcÞaÞb1 Tn  Tp þ a bðcÞað1 ðcÞaÞb1ðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
λn
0
P ¼ a bðcÞa1ð1 ðcÞaÞb1 Tn  Tp þ a bðcÞað1 ðcÞaÞb1ðT2n þ T2pÞ
h i1
:
The private provider’s optimization problem is presented and solved below:
max
P
π ¼ max
P
λpP ¼ max
P
1 ðcÞaÞb
 
P
π0P ¼ 0 , λp þ Pλp0P ¼ 0
P ¼ ð1 ðcÞaÞb Tn  Tp
a bðcÞa1ð1 ðcÞaÞb1
þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
 !
:
Once P is known, equilibrium proﬁt follows easily:
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π ¼ PλpðPÞ ¼ ð1 ðcÞaÞ2b
Tn  Tp
a bðcÞa1ð1 ðcÞaÞb1
þ cðT2n þ T2pÞ
 !
:
When price is P, welfare levels Wn, Wp, and W are:
Wn ¼ B ðc
Þa; a1; bþ 1ð Þ
a
 ð1 ðcÞaÞbc
 
ðτ  TnÞ;
Wp ¼ ð1 ðcÞaÞbc  B ðc
Þa; a1; bþ 1ð Þ
a
þ Γða
1 þ 1ÞΓðbþ 1Þ
Γð1þ a1 þ bÞ
 
ðτ  TpÞ  π;
W ¼ Γða
1 þ 1ÞΓðbþ 1Þ
Γð1þ a1 þ bÞ τ  c
ð1 ðcÞaÞbðTp  TnÞ  Tn B ðc
Þa; a1; bþ 1ð Þ
a
þ
Tp
B ðcÞa; a1; bþ 1ð Þ
a
 Γða
1 þ 1ÞΓðbþ 1Þ
Γð1þ a1 þ bÞ
 
;
where Bðx; y; zÞ is the incomplete Beta function, and ΓðxÞ is the Gamma function.
The derivative of W with regard to P is then as follows:
W0P ¼ c0PðcÞ c Tp  Tn
 þ T2n s B ðcÞa; pta1; ptbþ 1ð Þa
 
 cFðcÞ
 

T2p cFðcÞ  1þ 1 sþ
B ðcÞa; pta1; ptbþ 1ð Þ
a
 Γ 1þ a
1ð ÞΓðbþ 1Þ
Γ 1þ a1 þ bð Þ
  
;
This can be set equal to 0 and solved for P, yielding PW , the social welfare maximizing price.
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